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tion projects, or to project areas or facilities authorized by law for inclusion within a national recreation area or appropriate for administration by a Federal agency as a part of the national forest system, as a part of the public lands classified for retention in Federal ownership, or in connection with an authorized Federal program for the conservation and development of fish and wildlife.

(e) As used in this Act, the term "non-reimbursable" shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition of entrance, admission, and other recreation user fees or charges.

(f) Subsection 6(a)(2) of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (78 Stat. 897) shall not apply to costs allocated to recreation and fish and wildlife enhancement which are borne by the United States as a nonreimbursable project cost pursuant to subsection 2(a) or subsection 3(b)(1) of this Act.

(g) All payments and repayment by non-Federal public bodies under the provisions of this Act, and revenue from the conveyance by deed, lease, or otherwise, of lands under subsection 3(b)(2) of this Act, shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized as a part of any water resource development project under his control heretofore authorized, except projects or areas within national wildlife refuges, to construct, operate, and maintain or otherwise provide for basic public outdoor recreation facilities, such as boat ramps, picnic tables, beach areas, sanitation facilities, and parking areas of a total cost not to exceed \$50,000 for each water resource project.

Sec. 8. (a) The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to enter into agreements with Federal agencies or State or local public bodies for the administration of project land and water areas and the operations, maintenance, and replacement of facilities and to transfer project lands or facilities to Federal agencies or State or local public bodies by lease, conveyance, or exchange, upon such terms and conditions as will best promote the development and operation of such lands or facilities in the public interest for recreation purposes.

(b) No lands under the jurisdiction of any other Federal agency may be included for or devoted to recreation purposes under the authority of this Act without the consent in the head of such agency; and the head of any such agency is authorized to transfer any such lands to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior for purposes of this Act. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to transfer jurisdiction over project lands within or adjacent to the exterior boundaries of national forests and facilities thereon to the Secretary of Agriculture for recreation and other national forest system purposes; and such transfer shall be made in each case in which the project reservoir area is located wholly within the exterior boundaries of a national forest unless the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior jointly determine otherwise. Where any project lands are transferred hereunder to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture, the lands involved shall become national forest lands: *Provided*, That the lands and waters within the flow lines of any reservoir or otherwise needed or used for the operation of the project for other purposes shall continue to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior to the extent he determines to be necessary for such operation. Nothing herein shall limit the authority of the Secretary of the Interior granted by existing provisions of law relating to recreation development of water resource projects or to disposition of public lands for recreational purposes.

Sec. 9. Effective on and after January 1, 1966, neither the Secretary of the Interior nor any bureau nor any person acting under his authority shall engage in the preparation

of any feasibility report with respect to any water resource project unless the preparation of such feasibility report has been specifically authorized by law or specifically directed by either the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, or the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs by a resolution adopted by such committee, any other provision of law notwithstanding.

Sec. 10. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "project" shall mean a project or any appropriate unit thereof.

(b) The term "cost" shall mean the value of goods and services (land, labor, and supplies) used for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the project.

(c) The term "separable costs" shall mean the cost for each project purpose which is the difference between the cost of the multiple-purpose project and the cost of the project with the purpose omitted.

(d) The term "joint costs" shall mean the difference between the cost of the multiple-purpose project as a whole and the total of the separable costs for all project purposes.

(e) The term "feasibility report" shall mean any report of the scope required by the Congress when formally considering authorization of the project of which the report treats.

Sec. 11. This Act may be cited as the "Federal Water Project Recreation Act".

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF TEXAS

Mr. ROGERS of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ROGERS of Texas: "Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the provisions of H.R. 5269 as passed by the House."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 5269) was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS

Mr. ROGERS of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may be permitted to extend their remarks in the Record on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

INCIDENT AT BIEN HOA, VIETNAM

(Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, there have appear in the press some rather detailed accounts of the unfortunate incident at Bien Hoa airfield in Vietnam. This catastrophe resulted in the loss of life of some of our finest air crews and maintenance personnel.

As soon as he heard of this tragic event, General McConnell, the able Chief of Staff of the Air Force, immediately dispatched to Vietnam a team of his most experienced and competent personnel under the Inspector General, Lt. Gen. William K. Martin, to inquire into this incident.

The Committee on Armed Services was notified and has been briefed on this affair.

Obviously, there will be a great amount of speculation and postulating about our activities at this base in an effort to explain, or condemn, the cause of the explosions.

I remind all who are aroused, as I am, and as we all should be, by this incident, to remember our overall aims and objectives in Vietnam.

The Air Force is keeping us advised—it is making a thorough investigation of the affair—we still are fighting the Vietcong—we still have security problems—we still have to win a war.

Therefore, I urge everyone to refrain from any unnecessary discussion of the details of this incident, which could reveal classified information and jeopardize our military efforts.

To those who gave their lives so unexpectedly, yet so gallantly, we owe a reflective pause.

When the facts are known, they will be disclosed to the extent that security will permit.

I can assure you of this, and I hope and pray that you will help. We need help.

Thank you very much.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Mr. O'HARA of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. O'HARA of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I was heartened by the report in this morning's newspaper that the White House mission to the Dominican Republic, headed by McGeorge Bundy, was attempting to obtain the resignation of the Imbert junta and restoration of a constitutional government under the direction of persons associated with the party and program which received the overwhelming support of the Dominican people in the only free election held in that unhappy nation in over 30 years.

It is my fervent hope that we will persevere in these efforts in spite of the predictable reaction of the junta leadership which evidently equates popular government and opposition to military dictatorship with communism.

While it is proper and essential that the United States be determined to prevent the establishment of Communist-oriented governments in the Americas, it is equally important that we demonstrate a solid commitment to the creation and support of democratic and constitutional governments.

If we fail to demonstrate convincingly our hemisphere commitment to popular government, we will have let down the people of the Dominican Republic and our friends throughout Latin America and will have severely damaged our relations with other nations in the Western Hemisphere.

The twin objectives of opposition to Communist imperialism and support for democratic government are not mutually irreconcilable.

In the Dominican Republic, assuming the accuracy of our assessment of an at-

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slow moving, then the small business mouse nibbling at its feet can be frightening.

What's needed here as an antidote is for executives in the top echelons to think of the organization as compact, muscular, and alert.

2. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of small rivals. Companies often oversimplify the capabilities of an opponent. Stunned by the speed with which a small competitor was able to service an account, a steel supplier spent considerable time hashing over possible countermeasures. It wasn't until the marketing director pointed out that the rival's capabilities were limited to just a few items that the problem was seen in perspective.

The big company must learn to avoid getting involved in exhausting guerrilla warfare in the competitor's areas of strength. Technology, the traditional big gun of the large firm, should be used wisely in this connection.

The small firm is likely to remain strong in operations not subject to the computer revolution—unique products, custom production, personal and special services that machines can't handle. The larger firm can afford to be selective; in some cases, deciding not to become active in a given area may be the height of wisdom.

3. Adopt the small company's sense of time. An employee of a large food company recently set about looking for a new job, complaining: "Frankly, I'm frightened. I find myself taking 4 hours to do something I know I can do in an hour and a half. This is no way to work. I want a job that stimulates me, not one that puts me to sleep." The point is, the company expects the assignment to take 4 hours.

Despite widespread acceptance of Parkinson's law, that work expands to fit the time available to do it, many larger companies often operate under lax work schedules. This doesn't mean you should put on the screws. But workload and work pace should be in keeping with individual capacity.

The benefits to be gained are not only increased efficiency, but also heightened satisfaction and the self-esteem of the individual who feels he's carrying a man's load.

The larger company that thinks a sure-fire method of acquiring a small-company sense of time is to hire it must be cautious. "An executive moving from a small company to a large one often faces difficulties," comments recruiting consultant Kiernan, who has seen numerous examples of such transfers. "Many a fine performer in the small firm flounders and can't seem to mesh in a big organization. On the other hand, many men who grow up in small companies may reach a point where their experience, maturity and desire to grow give them the basis for success in a larger company. It depends on the individual, his personality and adaptability."

4. Decentralize selectively. Practitioners of organizational planning often admit confusion when faced with the time-honored dilemma of the centralize-decentralize saw-saw. Without the recentralization that results from automation and the use of computers, the idea of decentralizing may seem impractical. Nevertheless, large organizations have discovered some functions may remain centralized while others are decentralized.

When line functions can be put in the latter category, the shortening of communications lines, the increased flexibility of action can put the big company, at least in selected areas, more on a par with the smaller firm.

5. Centralize selectively. The small company generally benefits from short and uncomplicated communications lines. In addition, the fewer waystations there are in a communications link, the easier it becomes for informal communications to operate.

While informal communications are less

practical for the larger firm, new technological advances make instant communication possible. For example, computers for loading rail and air passenger carriers, hotel bookings and so on now make it possible to centralize scheduling, warehousing, filing systems and the like, regardless of how extensive they may be.

Entire functions, such as purchasing, payroll, inventory control, also may be centralized for larger firms, using computerized equipment and advanced information retrieval systems.

6. Emphasize small group loyalty and identification. A sufficient number of studies, as well as common experience, have established the fact that the individual can develop great emotional ties to a business.

Members' loyalties and emotional involvement tend to be stronger in relation to subordinate groups than to the bigger organization. The college alumnus tends to have stronger ties to the class of '45 than to the university as a whole. Similarly, the employee has greater feeling for the department in which he operates than for the company as a whole.

The organization that makes it possible for the individual to develop a sense of identity with his department or immediate work group by treating it as a unit can expect more in the way of loyalty and interest in job objectives.

But here's where many companies lull themselves into dangerous complacency by so-called "enlightened policies"—such as that of the "open door"—designed to give employees a feeling of closeness to executives and the company.

Says Hermon H. Scott, president of H. H. Scott, of Maynard, Mass., hi-fi equipment manufacturer: "In a small company, the top executives are generally available to anybody at any time within reason. In the big company, even though the top man may be in the same building, it is difficult for anyone to see him without an appointment, open door policy or not."

Or, as one disgruntled employee put it: "Sure, my boss' door is open—so he can kick people out."

7. Check for organizational blockage. Removal of organizational obstacles can put big company reflexes more on a par with the smaller firm. Managers are familiar with bottlenecks in production. Somewhat the same thing may take place with management procedures. A decision may get hung up somewhere along a chain of command; a communication may fail to penetrate a middle echelon. A number of specific questions can help pinpoint the bottlenecks:

If there is insufficient flow of ideas upward, where is the transmission failure?

If decisionmaking and implementation are unsatisfactory, where does the hesitation, buckpassing or failure to act take place?

What department tends to get out of step in carrying out company policy? Studies have indicated that everything from pilferage to higher absence rates results from communication blockages typical of some large firms.

Equally important is the need to distinguish between quantity and quality of communication. A weekly house organ may seem a worthwhile medium but is useless if nobody reads it. Failure to distinguish between going through the motions and actually producing results is often at the root of poor communications in the larger firm.

As for decision-making, often a major big-company problem, specific procedures tend to point up action-blockage:

Over-use of committees: In some companies, there is a tendency toward proliferation of committees for anything and everything—planning, problem-solving, development of ideas.

In other instances, procedures normally given over to one executive are made the responsibility of many. A typical example

is the hiring committee. An executive job opening is filled when a committee finally selects the best candidate. The trouble is that under this practice the man who usually gets the job may not be the best man at all, but merely the one to whom no one on the committee objects.

Foggy lines of authority: In some cases, necessary decisions are delayed because of the question of who has the authority to decide. Traditionally, this problem has involved line and staff executives in controversy. In many cases, the personalities of the respective executives cause the confusion. The problem may assume a variety of shapes:

A power-minded top executive may insist on making decisions handled by a subordinate.

An indecisive executive may try to pass a critical decision either up or down the line. The small-firm executive usually lacks this alternative, and therefore tends to make the decisions required anywhere in his area of responsibility.

The big company can force the same degree of decisiveness on its managers by clarifying its policies and procedures of decision-making, pinning down who is responsible for what, seeing that necessary decisions are not delayed. An occasional decision review to see how executives have been scoring with their decisions can clear the lines and stimulate the process.

Larger firms must also be careful to reward individual enterprise.

Big companies sometimes tend to build an atmosphere of apathy and an attitude of let's play it safe. This can only be dissipated by positive policies and action by the company. When an organization, by its rewards—promotion, salary increases, and so on—shows that it appreciates original thinking and responsible, tradition-breaking action, it fosters the creativity and drive it must have at all levels to keep moving ahead.

Incidentally, the assumption that big companies pay higher salaries than small ones is not generally substantiated: "There's not much difference in starting salaries between large and small firms," observes Hermon Scott. "Obviously, top salaries in the largest corporations are higher than any small company can pay. But actually, there are few such jobs. I would even go so far as to say that after the first couple of years, the average income for small-company executives tends to be higher than for larger companies."

Accordingly, discovering just how your salary levels compare with others in your industry and area may explain some mysteries of executive discontent and quitting.

The nature of our economy is such that there is a need for both large and small business. Certain services and products fall naturally within the sphere of each. Few small firms could produce an automobile, a computer, or an airplane. Few large firms can tie up large pieces of equipment with custom orders or highly specialized small runs. In between are areas in which big and small compete for customers. When this competition is carried on at high levels of efficiency, everyone benefits.

AUREN URIS,
Research Institute of America.

U.S. Policy in Defending Freedom

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. HOWARD W. CANNON

OF NEVADA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, May 18, 1965

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the recent actions by the United States in Viet-

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nam and in the Dominican Republic have brought a new determination and firmness to our policy of defending freedom in various sections of the globe where America has vital interests.

Basically, our military actions have served notice that we do not intend to follow a policy of appeasement wherever the Communists determine to test our will.

The essential meaning of this policy is recognized in several recent editorials published in the New York Journal-American and the New York World-Telegram. I ask unanimous consent to have three of these editorials printed in the Appendix of the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Journal-American, Apr. 28, 1965]

L.E.J. STANDS FIRM

In recent weeks, even days, the war in Vietnam has escalated to its most dangerous level. U.S. marines have fought with Vietcong guerrillas, and the presence of regular North Vietnamese Army formations in South Vietnam has been reported by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.

Hence, it was widely speculated that President Johnson's news conference would provide news of major importance. But it is simply a measure of the consistency of American policy in the Far East that it did not.

President Johnson, looking solemn but confident, merely reaffirmed that the United States would not yield to aggression in that area and repeated his offer to talk peace "with any government, anywhere, anytime, without any conditions."

Thus there were no surprises, nor should there have been.

The President declined to speculate about the possible future outright commitment of American ground forces in Vietnam and gently chided those who queried him on whether nuclear weapons might be used in Vietnam. No one in the Government has ever brought the issue up, he told his listeners.

But in view of the fact that there are many in this country who still do not appear to have grasped the meaning of the American action in Vietnam, President Johnson appropriately reminded them that we have merely learned the lesson taught at Munich—that appeasement leads to war.

[From the New York (N.Y.) World-Telegram, May 4, 1965]

OUR FIREBALD IMAGE

Because of our involvement in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, the United States is being treated to an overdose of world attention—much of it critical, and a lot of it, of course, not very well founded.

This is what we can expect for trying to be helpful all around, and for trying to look out for our own interests.

We have some hip-shooters in the British Parliament charging us with "monstrous aggression" for sending troops to the Dominican Republic. Newspaper editors in Europe and elsewhere are busy experting the confused situation in Santo Domingo—and some who denounce the United States for intervening also say we should use our force to put former President Juan Bosch back in power.

Bosch seems to think so, too.

It would be nice to have everybody thinking we are wise, generous, and altogether pure. We have spent and given away billions of dollars to help others and thus, hopefully, to make ourselves better understood.

But we can't combat communism, repel armed aggression, rescue innocent souls trapped in mob scenes, or look after our own best interests and the general safety of free allies—and worry too much about our image all over the globe.

Our Government has to make decisions and sometimes they have to be made fast. We can't base decisions by guessing how everybody is going to react. The Communist governments are predictable, but everybody in friendly countries is not.

As the President said, we like friends, but when we have a job to do, we will go ahead and do it, "whether we make friends or lose them."

In the long run, the current squawks notwithstanding, we will make more friends by being honest with our own well-known principles, and acting on them.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Journal-American, May 4, 1965]

WE KNOW THE FACE

The enemy is the same. The reason for the presence of American troops is the same. The only real difference between the U.S. military actions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam—apart from their extent—is that they are taking place on different sides of the world.

In Vietnam, we are witnessing one phase of a long-term Communist plan to seize and subjugate a densely populated, rice rich region of southeast Asia. In the Dominican Republic it is a case of swift, skilled Communist exploitation of a tragic social eruption—with the identical aim of seizure and subjugation—this time in the strategic Caribbean.

There, in 1958, a submerged Communist element rode the crest of a wave of popular discontent, surfacing only when victory was achieved. Thus a bridgehead hostile to the United States was established in Cuba. It is simply the matter of U.S. national self-interest that this strategy of the overt or covered coup, by an armed, organized minority not be permitted to repeat itself, certainly not this close to home.

CAN'T TOLERATE RED MENACE

Let anyone take undue note of Soviet and other Communist rantings in the United Nations or elsewhere, let us recall Hungary. There in 1956 thousands of death-dealing Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest—because the Soviet Union was not prepared to permit a free, democratic state to establish itself near Russia's borders in Eastern Europe.

For the Soviet Union, freedom behind the Iron Curtain—as in West Berlin—is a menace. For the United States, communism in the Western Hemisphere—as in Cuba—is a menace.

Let the faint hearts and those who entertain qualms about our action in the Dominican Republic dwell upon this. Moreover it must be noted that the Charter of the U.N. itself expressly recognizes the right of nations to act when their fundamental national self-interests are threatened.

Finally, we are impressed by the decisiveness of President Johnson's dispatch of troops to the embattled Republic. In addition, we are dazzled by the display of logistics which brought so much to bear within so short a time. Let students of American muscle, whether friend or foe, ponder this and draw from it the appropriate lesson.

Sherman's March Through the Carolinas

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM M. TUCK

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 18, 1965

Mr. TUCK. Mr. Speaker, on May 11 I had the privilege of attending a dinner given by the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia at the Army-Navy Club. Dr. John G. Barrett, professor of history at the Virginia Military Institute, was the speaker for the occasion, delivering a speech describing Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman's march through the Carolinas. He is the author of a book bearing that title.

Dr. Barrett's speech was most interesting and enlightening, bringing out many important facts and features about both the march and the man who led it. I consider the address of keen historic significance and worthy of being printed and preserved in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Under leave previously granted me to extend my remarks, I include the same, which is as follows:

SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS

Although William Tecumseh Sherman could not recall saying "War is hell," he did state: "You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you cannot refine it." It was in the fall of 1862 that he developed his philosophy of total war which he thought would make conflict "so terrible" that the South would exhaust all peaceful remedies before commencing another struggle. Considering all the people of the South as enemies of the Union, Sherman planned to use his military forces against the civilian population as well as the armies of the enemy. He believed this plan of action would not only demoralize the non-combatants but also the men under arms.

The southern armies in the field, he felt certain, could be disheartened by attacks on the civilian population, as easily as by defeats on the battlefield. Sherman's program of total war also called for the destruction of the enemy's economic resources. By paralyzing the Confederate economy he hoped to destroy the South's ability to supply its fighting forces with war materials. Thus in bringing war to the homefront he hoped to destroy both the South's capacity to wage war and its will to fight.

"Collective responsibility," the theory upon which total war rests, made possible a new mode of warfare in which the accepted rules of the time were transgressed. The effect was a certain disregard for human rights and dignity. But with Sherman "war * * * [was] war and not popularity seeking." He thought the South, for its part in bringing on the conflict, deserved "all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out." Nevertheless, he held out to his enemies the sincere promise of helping hand if they would lay down their arms and rejoin the Union. It was not a sense of cruelty and barbarism that prompted Sherman to formulate his theory of total war. This conception was the outgrowth of a search for the quickest, surest, and most efficient means to win a struggle. Victory, he determined, could be won more easily by moving troops than by